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FramingHate: Moral Foundations, Party Cues, and (In)Tolerance of Offensive
Speech
Grant M. Armstronga, Julie Wronski*a
[a] Department of Political Science, University of Mississippi, University, MS, USA.
Abstract
One of the most controversial elements of political tolerance concerns support for hate speech. We argue that there are two
factors that can reduce tolerance for hate speech: 1) moral foundations and 2) party cues. U.S. citizens’ tolerance of hate
speech will be reduced when it is framed as a violation of a specific moral foundation, opposed by a political party, or when
the morality violation is utilized by party elites. Using two survey experiments, we manipulated the target of hate speech (i.e.
Muslims or the American flag), whether the speech violated a moral foundation (i.e. harm or loyalty), and which political party
supported or opposed the hate speech in question. For flag burning, moral frames and party cues on their own reduced U.S.
citizens’ tolerance relative to a non-political control, while moral frames and party cues were successful in reducing tolerance
of anti-Muslim speech compared to a free speech appeal. Partisans were generally responsive to cues from the in-party. We
also found instances of moral repackaging, where morally incongruent appeals from the in-party reduced tolerance of flag
burning among Democrats. Among Republicans, harm morality decreased tolerance of anti-Muslim speech when invoked by
the in-party, but increased tolerance when used by the out-party – an indication of the power of party cues to repackage moral
arguments and to trigger backlash. These results provide a better understanding of what factors can affect tolerance for hate
speech, providing political leaders and social justice advocates with a roadmap to alleviate this problem.
Keywords: hate speech, political tolerance, moral foundations, party cues
Non-Technical Summary
Background
One of the foundational components of a democratic society is political tolerance. Conceptualized as the willingness to
extend the rights of citizenship to a social group, political tolerance typically involves allowing members of unpopular or
marginalized groups to teach in public schools, publish provocative materials, compete for positions of political power,
and freely discuss their values and beliefs in public. Yet, there exists a dark side to political tolerance: support for hate
speech as a form of free speech. When a society writ large tolerates hateful or offensive speech, it victimizes its most
vulnerable members, catalyzes discrimination and oppression of social groups, and ultimately threatens that society's
social justice principles.
Why was this study done?
We seek to identify methods of reducing tolerance towards harmful speech within the American political context, in an
effort to address this threat to social justice. We identify two frames through which public tolerance for hate speech can
be diminished 1) Moral Foundations Theory, and 2) Partisan Cue-Taking. Yet, the specific methods by which moral
foundations and partisan cues can shape tolerance of hate speech are unclear. Can party cues and moral frames reduce
tolerance for hate speech in isolation, or do they work in tandem? Is moral reframing capable of reducing tolerance for
hate speech? Are cues from the in-party ubiquitously successful in reducing tolerance of hate speech, even when they
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employ atypical moral arguments? Conversely, can cues from the out-party ever reduce tolerance, or do they produce
backlash and greater tolerance of hate speech?
What did the researchers do and find?
We examine howmoral frames and party cues affect tolerance for U.S. flag burning and anti-MuslimMuhammad cartoon
drawings. Using two survey experiments conducted via Amazon's Mechanical Turk platform, we manipulated the target
of hate speech (i.e. Muslims or the American flag), whether the speech violated a specific moral foundation (i.e. harm
or loyalty), which party supported or opposed the hateful speech, and whether a party invoked a particular moral frame
when stating their opposition. Depending on the type of harmful speech, moral frames and party cues on their own
reduced U.S. citizens’ tolerance of hate speech. Unsurprisingly, partisans were responsive to cues from the in-party,
and occasionally exhibited decreased tolerance towards hate speech when it was presented as a moral frame violation
that resonated with their party's values (i.e. Democrats and harm; Republicans and loyalty). We also found some instances
of successful moral reframing. While morally congruent arguments from the out-party had no effect on reducing tolerance,
morally incongruent appeals from the in-party (i.e., Democratic Party embracing loyalty) reduced tolerance of flag burning
speech among Democrats. Interestingly, among Republicans, harm/care morality decreased tolerance of anti-Muslim
speech when invoked by the in-party in one study, but increased tolerance among Republicans when used by Democrats
in the other study – an indication of the power of party cues to repackage moral arguments and to trigger backlash.
What do these findings mean?
Overall, our results provide a more nuanced understanding of what factors can reduce (or intensify) tolerance for hate
speech. Our findings carry important normative implications for promoting social justice by illuminating methods which
political leaders and advocates can employ in order to undercut tolerance for exceptionally uncivil speech. In the current
American political environment where a new type of vitriol has been normalized, party leaders can generate opposition
toward certain forms of hate speech, even when that speech is targeted at relatively unpopular ethnic or religious groups
(such as Muslim-Americans). Such a shift in attitudes about hate speech might lessen negative attitudes toward these
groups. In this respect, party leaders can facilitate a more tolerant society by discussing hate speech as a type of morality
violation, or simply and more effectively, by condemning such speech without moral appeals.
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One of the foundational components of a democratic society is political tolerance. Conceptualized as the willingness
to extend the rights of citizenship to a social group (Gibson 1992, 2005), political tolerance typically involves al-
lowing members of unpopular or marginalized groups to teach in public schools, publish provocative materials,
compete for positions of political power, and freely discuss their values and beliefs in public. Yet, there exists a
dark side to political tolerance: support for hate speech as a form of free speech (Brison, 2013; Lambe, 2004;
Peffley, Knigge, & Hurwitz, 2001). When a society writ large tolerates hateful or offensive speech, it victimizes its
most vulnerable members (Boeckmann & Liew, 2002; Leets, 2002), catalyzes discrimination and oppression of
social groups (Tsesis, 2002), and ultimately threatens that society's social justice principles.
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Hate speech emerged as a controversial topic of political debate following the end of World War II. According to
the American Bar Association, it is defined as "speech that offends, threatens, or insults groups, based on race,
color, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, disability, or other traits."i While some European nations have
balanced freedom of expression with respect and equality for individuals by forbidding the utterance of hate speech
(Cohen, 2014), the United States’ Supreme Court has consistently upheld the constitutionality of speech that
possesses an offensive nature or low value, even when that speech is intentional and emotionally harmful to
vulnerable groups (Brison, 2013; Cohen, 2014). Though the debate on tolerating hate speech is decades old, it
has recently reached a fever pitch on college campuses and in the context of "political correctness" (Altman, 1993;
Delgado & Yun, 1994; Lukianoff & Haidt, 2015; Massaro, 1991). More recently, this conflict between tolerating
hateful speech and fighting for social justice was embodied in the August 2017 Charlottesville, VA protests, and
President Trump's subsequent comment that there were "some very fine people on both sides."ii Against this
backdrop, we seek to identify methods of reducing tolerance towards harmful speech within the American political
context, in an effort to address this threat to social justice.
Prior research demonstrates that political tolerance of hate speech is largely contingent upon the framing of such
speech (Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997). Building upon this work, we integrate social psychology and political
science theories to identify two additional frames through which public tolerance for hate speech can be diminished:
1) Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt, 2012) and 2) Partisan Cue-Taking (Zaller, 1992). Yet, the specific methods
by which moral foundations and partisan cues can shape tolerance of hate speech are unclear. Can party cues
and moral frames reduce tolerance for hate speech in isolation, or do they work in tandem? Is moral reframing
(Feinberg & Willer, 2013) capable of reducing tolerance for hate speech? Are cues from the in-party ubiquitously
successful in reducing tolerance of hate speech, even when they employ atypical moral arguments? Conversely,
can cues from the out-party ever reduce tolerance, or do they produce backlash and greater tolerance of hate
speech?
To answer these questions, we examine howmoral frames and party cues affect tolerance for two distinct instances
of hate speech: 1) U.S. flag burning, which likely should be deemed more offensive by Republicans who hold
national loyalty moral values (Graham & Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Graham, 2007), and 2) anti-Muslim Muhammad
cartoon drawings, which likely should be considered more offensive by Democrats who wish to protect minority
groups from harm (Ditto & Koleva, 2011; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Koleva et al., 2012). Using two survey
experiments conducted via Amazon's Mechanical Turk platform, we manipulated the target of hate speech (i.e.
Muslims or the American flag), whether the speech violated a specific moral foundation (i.e. harm or loyalty), which
party supported or opposed the hateful speech, and whether a party invoked a particular moral frame when stating
their opposition. Depending on the type of harmful speech, moral frames and party cues on their own reduced
U.S. citizens’ tolerance of hate speech. In the case of flag burning, we observed this pattern relative to a non-po-
litical control, while moral frames and party cues were successful in reducing tolerance of anti-Muslim speech
when pitted against a free speech appeal.
Unsurprisingly, partisans were responsive to cues from the in-party, and occasionally exhibited decreased tolerance
towards hate speech when it was presented as a moral frame violation that resonated with their party's values
(i.e. Democrats and harm; Republicans and loyalty). We also found some instances of successful moral reframing.
While morally congruent arguments from the out-party had no effect on reducing tolerance, morally incongruent
appeals from the in-party (i.e., The Democratic Party embracing loyalty) reduced tolerance of flag burning speech
among Democrats. Interestingly, among Republicans, harm/care morality decreased tolerance of anti-Muslim
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speech when invoked by the in-party in one study, but increased tolerance when used by the out-party in the
other study – an indication of the power of party cues to repackage moral arguments and to trigger backlash. We
did not observe such backlash among Democrats, as loyalty frames used by the Republican Party had no effect.
Overall, our results provide a more nuanced understanding of what factors can reduce (or intensify) tolerance for
hate speech, providing a roadmap that political leaders and social justice advocates can use to alleviate this
problem.
Political Tolerance, Moral Foundations, and Party Cues
Political tolerance refers to one's degree of willingness to extend the rights of citizenship to other groups, particu-
larly marginalized or unpopular groups (Gibson, 1992, 2005). These levels of tolerance typically are determined
by public support for allowing marginalized groups to become teachers in schools, to hold positions of government
authority, and, of relevance to the present study, to speak freely in public (Schwadel & Garneau, 2014; Twenge,
Carter, & Campbell, 2015). In the U.S., while political tolerance has increased overall during the past half century
(Schafer & Shaw, 2009), tolerance towards different groups has varied, where certain groups, like Muslims, have
remained marginalized, while other groups, including the LGBT community, have experienced increased tolerance
(Gibson, 2008; Schwadel & Garneau, 2014).
Much of the literature examines tolerance through the lens of inter-group conflict, and describes an inverse effect,
such that, when fear of a particular group is high, political tolerance exhibited towards that group is low (Davis,
2007; Davis & Silver, 2004; Gibson, 1988; Stone, 2004; Sullivan et al., 1981). For instance, political intolerance
towards Communists rose during the McCarthy era of the Cold War, and civil liberty guarantees were minimized
for those of Muslim and Arabic backgrounds following the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Davis & Silver, 2004; Gibson,
2008). Thus, a perceived threat from a particular group can reduce public support for the political speech of that
group, and even increase support for speech targeting that group (i.e. hate speech). Even more, hate crimes tend
to increase with an induction of threat. For instance, crimes against Muslim-Americans significantly increased
following the 9/11 attacks (Byers & Jones, 2007). In the case of political speech, these group-based fears are
activated by public safety concerns, which, in turn, decrease tolerance. Notably, public support for a Ku Klux Klan
rally decreased when this speech was framed as a public disturbance (Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997).
Building upon this research, we argue that tolerance for certain forms of political speech, and in particular hateful,
offensive speech, can be similarly diminished when that speech is framed as violating key moral foundations.
According to Haidt (2012), individuals employ five core moral foundations – care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and
sanctity – when reacting to political stimuli and forming policy preferences (see also Ditto & Koleva, 2011; Koleva
et al., 2012). When a policy is portrayed as either upholding or violating a particular moral foundation, public
support for that policy can be swayed. For instance, on the issue of same-sex marriage, opposition is largely
driven by purity and sanctity morals that non-traditional marriages violate, while support is garnered by viewing
same-sex marriage through the lens of care and fairness towards the LGBT community (Haidt, 2012; Haidt &
Graham, 2007). Moral foundation appeals can, furthermore, convince citizens to take atypical policy positions
and re-evaluate preferred candidates by repackaging the topic using a different moral lens – a process defined
as "moral reframing" (Day et al., 2014; Feinberg & Willer 2013, 2015; Voelkel & Feinberg, 2018). For example,
conservatives can hold more liberal, pro-environment attitudes when policies are couched in arguments about
loyalty, authority and purity (Feinberg & Willer, 2013; Kidwell, Farmer, & Hardesty, 2013; Wolsko, Ariceaga, &
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Seiden, 2016), while framing military spending and English as the United States' official language in terms of
fairness makes liberals more likely to take conservative positions on these issues (Feinberg & Willer, 2015).
In similar fashion, tolerance of hate speech should depend on which moral value is being emphasized, with the
expectation that depicting offensive speech as a morality violation will reduce support for that type of speech.
While the effectiveness of any particular moral foundation in moving political attitudes varies across ideologues
(per Day et al., 2014; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009), with some foundations more potent for liberals and others
for conservatives, moral arguments can nonetheless serve as a method of reducing aggregate tolerance for hate
speech. This should especially be the case when moral frames are employed as a foil against free speech appeals,
building upon Nelson et al. (1997).
In addition to moral foundation appeals, party heuristics (Campbell et al., 1960) should be able to shape opinions
regarding tolerance of hate speech through the process of elite cue-taking (Lupia, 1994). These cues signal to
partisans where they should stand on a variety of issues, including social welfare programs, immigration reform,
and energy policies (Druckman, Peterson, & Slothuus, 2013; Evans & Pickup, 2010; Gerber & Huber, 2010).
These cues can influence citizens’ evaluations of political events and candidates (Bartels, 2002; Gerber, Huber,
& Washington, 2010; Goren, 2005), and move attitudes on divisive issues such as abortion (Achen & Bartels,
2016) or non-political judgments (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015). Thus, citizens form their political attitudes through
the judgments of those individuals with whom they share a partisan identity, even to the extent that the positions
of their party can override evaluations of substantive policy content (Cohen, 2003). Moreover, party cues provide
the contextual information necessary for citizens to construct a relationship between a message and their dispo-
sitional beliefs (Zaller, 1992). In the case of hate speech, party cues should alert citizens as to which moral foun-
dation is being violated by the offensive speech, and help them connect their moral values with their tolerance of
that speech. Put simply, when a political party opposes a form of hate speech under the premise that the speech
undermines a coremoral value of the citizenry, this endorsement legitimizes themoral violation frame, and enhances
its ability to reduce tolerance of hate speech. Since moral frames and party cues should have the ability to reduce
tolerance towards hate speech in isolation, as described above, we expect:
1. Moral Frame Alone Hypothesis
2. Party Cues Alone Hypothesis
We also should observe nuanced variation when moral frames and party cues are combined. Specifically, individ-
uals should react to moral foundation violation frames and party cues on the basis of 1) the type of harmful speech
in question, 2) which political party opposes that speech, and 3) individuals own partisan affiliations. We can,
furthermore, tease apart the efficacy of moral violation frames when they are endorsed by the in-party or out-
party, and when they utilize moral reframing. This leads us to propose four pathways by which the combination
of moral and party cues can influence political tolerance of hate speech:
1. Congruent Moral Frame from In-Party Hypothesis
2. Congruent Moral Frame from Out-Party Hypothesis
3. Incongruent Moral Frame from In-Party Hypothesis
4. Backlash Hypothesis
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We examine two contemporary forms of hate speech that allow us to explore these nuances: United States flag
burning, and anti-Muslim Muhammad cartoon drawings.
Tolerance for Flag Burning and Anti-Muslim Speech
The United States’ constitution provides generous protections on free speech. Moreover, court rulings consistent
therewith seem to be consonant with public opinion. A 2016 Pew Research poll shows that Americans are more
tolerant of free speech than any other nation (Wike, 2016). Generally, Americans believe that people should be
able to say what they want, even if those utterances may be offensive or harmful to members of certain social
groups (i.e. hate speech). Bolstering this acceptance of hate speech, 67% of Americans believe “that people
should be allowed to make public statements that are offensive to minority groups,” while 77% of Americans
“support the right of others to make statements that are offensive to their own religious beliefs” (Pew Research
Center, 2017). Yet, there exists some heterogeneity in political tolerance for hate speech. Republicans and
Democrats tolerate different groups, wherein Republicans demonstrate greater intolerance toward pro-gay and
pro-choice activists, while Democrats exhibit greater intolerance toward pro-life and anti-gay activists (Crawford
& Pilanski, 2014).
Because Republicans and Democrats display varying levels of tolerance for certain social groups (Crawford &
Pilanski, 2014) and rely upon different moral frameworks (Haidt, 2012), we can locate examples of offensive
speech that Republicans should be more likely to tolerate than Democrats, and vice versa. Two examples are
flag burning and anti-Muslim speech. For Republicans, burning the American flag should be deemed offensive
since they tend to be more patriotic and hold stronger national loyalty moral values (Graham & Haidt, 2012; Haidt
& Graham, 2007). Anti-Muslim speech, in contrast, should be considered hateful by Democrats who wish to protect
minority groups from harm (Ditto & Koleva, 2011; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek 2009; Koleva et al., 2012). While both
forms of speech are constitutionally protected, tolerance for each should differ across Democrats and Republicans.
Flag burning was ruled constitutionally protected speech in the 1989 Supreme Court case of Texas v Johnson.
Nevertheless, public support for such speech has remained low. A 2006 Gallup poll showed that a majority of
Americans would favor a constitutional amendment banning the desecration and burning of the flag (Carroll, 2006).
There is also evidence that Republicans are more accepting of banning flag burning than Democrats. Depending
on the framing of the issue, Republicans were 12%-17% more likely than Democrats to favor banning this type
of speech (Carroll, 2006). Academic research complements these findings (Graham & Haidt, 2012; Haidt, 2012),
concluding that Republicans, driven by loyalty and authoritarianism, are less likely than Democrats to be tolerant
of flag burning.
Moral Frame Alone Hypothesis and Party Cues Alone Hypothesis
Inextricably tied to tolerance of flag burning is the moral foundation of loyalty/betrayal, defined by strong in-group
attachments with devotion to a group, institution, or state (Haidt, 2012). While conservatives, and by extension
via partisan sorting (Levendusky, 2009; Mason, 2015) Republicans,iii value all five foundations almost equally,
they tend to rely upon the socially “binding” foundations of loyalty, authority, and purity when assessing political
and social issues (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). In contrast, liberals and Democrats favor the "individualizing"
foundations of care and fairness, and place little weight on loyalty values when forming political attitudes. As such,
messages framing flag burning as a violation of the loyalty moral foundation (Moral Frame Alone Hypothesis) and
detailing Republican Party opposition to it (Party Cues Alone Hypothesis) should reduce tolerance among Repub-
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licans, thus entrenching their existing disapproval of this form of offensive speech in the presence of a morally
congruent appeal (per Day et al., 2014).
While U.S. public opinion toward Muslims has been cold since 9/11, Muslims recently have been viewed more
favorably by the American public (Pew Research Center, 2017). Their favorability rating has increased since 2014
to about 48 on a 100-point feeling thermometer scale (Pew Research Center, 2017). Despite the recent increase,
it is still the lowest rating for any religious group, falling behind even atheists. Further, Republicans are more
likely than Democrats, according to these Pew polls, to believe that the Islamic religion is more likely than others
to encourage violence among its believers, and to view Muslims as more extreme and less American. In turn,
stemming from their emphasis on care/harmmorality and concern to shield vulnerable groups in society, Democrats
should consider anti-Muslim speech offensive and exhibit less tolerance towards it than Republicans (Ditto &
Koleva, 2011; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Koleva et al., 2012). As a result, message frames that employ "in-
dividualizing" harmmorality (Moral Frame Alone Hypothesis) and Democratic Party disapproval (Party Cues Alone
Hypothesis) in opposition to anti-Muslim speech should reduce already lower tolerance for this speech among
Democrats. Given past research on the inefficacy of incongruent moral appeals (Day et al., 2014; Feinberg &
Willer 2013, 2015; Kidwell et al., 2013; Wolsko, Ariceaga, & Seiden, 2016), loyalty and harm appeals on their own
should have a weaker impact on reducing tolerance among Democrats and Republicans, respectively.iv
Congruent Moral Frame and In-Party Cues Hypothesis
Individuals tend to show particular deference to authority figures from their in-group (Frimer, Gaucher, & Schaefer,
2014), suggesting that they should be more responsive to frames and cues coming from their own party. With the
Republican Party's reverence of national symbols and patriotism, and the Democratic Party's commitment to di-
versity and inclusion of Muslim-Americans, party cues should be the most effective in reducing tolerance for
harmful speech when addressing an in-group owned issue. This means that partisans should reduce their tolerance
for hate speech in lock-step with their party's opposition, particularly when the Republican Party opposes flag
burning and the Democratic Party opposes anti-Muslim speech, as these acts represent moral violations to in-
group members (per Voelkel & Brandt, 2019). Further, Republicans should respond to Republican Party cues
opposing flag burning based on a loyalty frame, while Democrats should respond to Democrat Party cues opposing
anti-Muslim speech based on a harm morality frame, because these cues are, in essence, speaking the group's
moral language (per Lakoff, 2010).
Congruent Moral Frame From Out-Party Hypothesis and Incongruent Moral Frame From
In-Party Hypothesis
Party cues may also act as a repackaging agent for moral frames in order to reduce tolerance for offensive speech
among partisans who would otherwise be supportive of protecting flag burning or anti-Muslim speech. Such moral
reframing can decrease tolerance for hate speech by either 1) targeting members of the out-party and presenting
them with a moral argument that resonates with their ideological values (in line with Day et al., 2014; Feinberg &
Willer, 2013, 2015; Kidwell, Farmer, & Hardesty, 2013; Wolsko, Ariceaga, & Seiden, 2016), or 2) targeting members
of the in-party and advancing a moral argument that is ideologically incongruent with their members' beliefs (a
novel advancement of the moral reframing theoretical framework). In the former (Congruent Moral Frame from
Out-Party Hypothesis), Democrats should decrease their tolerance of anti-Muslim speech when the Republican
Party frames it as a harm morality violation, and Republicans should be less tolerant of flag burning when the
Democratic Party decries it as a betrayal of the nation. In the latter (Incongruent Moral Frame from In-Party Hy-
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pothesis), Democrats should decrease their tolerance of flag burning when the Democratic Party frames it as a
loyalty morality violation, and Republicans should express intolerance towards anti-Muslim speech when the Re-
publican Party claims that it harms Muslim-Americans.
Backlash Effect Hypothesis
Yet, recent research on "negative partisanship" (Abramowitz & Webster, 2016) has shown that individuals can
react to the positions of out-party elites, with disdain towards the out-group driving backlash. It is therefore also
possible that individuals may respond to moral foundation violation frames and party cues by increasing their tol-
erance of hateful speech that the out-party opposes. This likely will be pronounced when the instance of hate
speech opposed by out-party generates antipathy, such as when Republicans see the Democratic Party opposing
anti-Muslim speech and Democrats see the Republican Party opposing flag burning. Thus, when the Democratic
Party uses harm morality in an effort to oppose anti-Muslim speech, Republicans might actually support such
speech so as to distance themselves from Democrats. Democrats might respond similarly to the Republican
Party's use of loyalty moral frames to increase their tolerance and support of flag burning.
As party cues vary in their persuasiveness across issue salience (Ciuk & Yost, 2016), the current research affords
an ideal context for ascertaining the role of parties in moral reframing, and a general understanding of how partisan
and moral appeals can shape tolerance for hate speech.
Method
To examine how moral foundations and party cues can reduce political tolerance towards offensive speech, we
employed two online survey experiments that manipulated information about a hypothetical instance of hate
speech in a mock news story format.v The first (Study 1) was administered in June 2017, while the second (Study
2) was conducted in November 2018, with both utilizing participants from Amazon's Mechanical Turk (Mturk)
platform and administered through Qualtrics' online survey software. By conducting our studies in different time
periods with two different samples, we ameliorated the potential pre-treatment problems inherent in framing ex-
periments (as noted by Druckman & Leeper, 2012). The details of the design and specific measures vary slightly
across the two studies, but both include the experimental treatment, a measure of support for protecting various
types of hate speech, and measures assessing participants’ moral foundations, political preferences, and demo-
graphic background.
Experimental Treatment
Each of our experimental studies manipulated information about two hypothetical instances of hate speech that
were based on actual events: 1) the burning of the United States flag, and 2) a Muhammad cartoon-drawing
contest. The story about U.S. flag burning was based on a demonstration in Brooklyn, New York in 2015, where
protesters who burned the flag claimed police brutality and systematic racism within the justice system.vi The anti-
Muslim example was based on an event in Garland, Texas where attendees, including certain prominent right-
wing political figures, drew different depictions of Islam’s prophet Muhammad in an overt affront to members of
the Muslim community.vii
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Using these fictionalized news stories detailing an instance of hate speech, we implemented a between subjects
factorial design, such that each respondent was randomly assigned to read a single news story.viii Study 1 employed
a 2x4 factorial design with 8 possible conditions, whereas Study 2 used a 2x5 factorial plus control design such
that participants were randomly assigned to one of 11 conditions (see Figure A1 in the Supplementary Materials).ix
The first manipulated factor in both studies was the target of hateful speech, where respondents read a story
about either 1) a demonstration where the American flag was burned, or 2) an event featuring a Muhammad cartoon
contest (hereafter referred to as the "flag burning" and "Anti-Muslim" conditions, respectively). Study 2 also included
a pure control condition that described a non-controversial, non-political event, in order to establish a baseline
measure of tolerance for flag burning and anti-Muslim speech.x Each story was paired with a relevant picture.
The second manipulated factor was the moral frame and party’s response to the hate speech. In Study 1 respon-
dents were informed that the event in question was either an example of 1) free speech, 2) speech that violates
a moral foundation (loyalty in the case of flag burning, and harm for anti-Muslim speech), 3) speech that the Re-
publican Party deems a moral foundation violation and opposes, but the Democratic Party does not oppose, or
4) speech that the Democratic Party deems a moral foundation violation and opposes, but the Republican Party
does not oppose.
For the free speech and moral foundation conditions in Study 1, respondents were presented the following text,
after being introduced to the flag burning or anti-Muslim event:
Flag Burning condition: "Burning the U.S. flag, as shown in the picture, is [an expression of free speech
that cannot be taken away by the government/ destruction of a national symbol and it betrays patriotic
Americans]."
Anti-Muslim condition: "Drawing cartoons of the prophet Muhammad, as shown in the picture, is [an ex-
pression of free speech that cannot be taken away by the government/offensive and can be emotionally
harmful and intimidating to Muslim-Americans]."
In the party cues conditions, respondents were presented with information regarding whether each party supported
or opposed that form of speech:
Flag Burning condition: "The [Democratic/Republican] Party criticized the event, saying that burning the
U.S. flag is destruction of a national symbol and it betrays patriotic Americans. The [Republican/Demo-
cratic] Party, however, disagreed and stressed that burning the U.S. flag, as shown in the picture, is an
expression of free speech that cannot be taken away by the government."
Anti-Muslim condition: "The [Democratic/Republican] Party criticized the event, saying that drawing cartoons
of the prophet Muhammad, as shown in the picture, is offensive and can be emotionally harmful and in-
timidating to Muslim-Americans. The [Republican/Democrat] Party, however, disagreed and stressed that
drawing cartoons of the prophet Muhammad, as shown in the picture, is an expression of free speech
that cannot be taken away by the government."
These treatments, however, provided information from both parties simultaneously. As such, Republican opposition
to hate speech was stated in tandem with Democratic tolerance of hate speech, and vice versa. The use of both
parties in the treatments, while increasing the overall amount of party cue information to the respondent, inhibits
our ability to discern whether the effects stem from the endorsement by the respondent's in-party or by the oppo-
sition of the respondent's out-party. Further, party opposition was always coupled with a moral foundation violation.
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While the coupling of party cues with a moral foundation violation frame should produce the greatest decrease in
tolerance for hate speech (the additive effect of the Moral Frame Alone Hypothesis and the Party Cues Alone
Hypothesis), the experimental design in Study 1 prevents us from estimating the effect of party cues independent
of the moral frame.
In order to disentangle the effects between in-party and out-party cues, and estimate effects of party cues inde-
pendent of any moral foundation framing, Study 2 manipulated the discussion of the offensive event in question
as an example of 1) speech that violates a moral foundation (loyalty in the case of flag burning, and harm for anti-
Muslim speech), 2) speech that the Democratic Party opposes, 3) speech that the Republican Party opposes, 4)
speech that the Republican Party opposes on the basis of it being a moral foundation violation, and 5) speech
that the Democratic Party opposes on the basis of it being a moral foundation violation.xi The moral foundation
violation frame used the same text as Study 1. The Democratic and Republican Party opposition conditions read
as follows:
Flag Burning condition: "Recently, in a large U.S. city, there was a U.S. flag-burning demonstration led
by a group of protesters. The [Democratic/Republican] Party believes that burning the U.S. flag, as shown
in the picture, should not be protected by the First Amendment."
Anti-Muslim condition: "Recently, in a U.S. city, there was an event where cartoons of the prophet
Muhammad were drawn by a group of protesters. The [Democratic/Republican] Party believes that
drawing cartoons of the prophet Muhammad, as shown in the picture, should not be protected by the First
Amendment."
Finally, the Democratic and Republican Party opposition using a moral foundation framework conditions were
displayed in the following manner:
Flag Burning condition: "The [Democratic/Republican] Party criticized the event, saying that burning the
U.S. flag is destruction of a national symbol and it betrays patriotic Americans."
Anti-Muslim condition: "The [Democratic/Republican] Party criticized the event, saying that drawing cartoons
of the prophet Muhammad, as shown in the picture, is offensive and can be emotionally harmful and in-
timidating to Muslim-Americans."
Mturk Samples
Study 1 was conducted in June 2017, while Study 2 was fielded in November 2018, both using Mturk. Of the 1461
respondents who started Study 1, 1410 received at least the experimental treatment and answered the associated
protected free speech opinion item. Our realized sample excludes six respondents who noted in the comments
that the party cues were incorrect, or were in the free speech condition and hostile towards the study (e.g. made
disparaging remarks about the institution conducting the research). Similarly, in Study 2, 2226 respondents began
the study, but only 1870 completed the free speech opinion item and were not identified as fraudulent respondents
(per Kennedy, Clifford, Burleigh, Waggoner, & Jewell, 2018). As such, we dropped 188 respondents who were
suspect foreign IP locations, VPS users, or came from the same remote geolocation. By omitting the reversed
party cues conditions, and any mention of a political party supporting hate speech, Study 2 did not include any
respondents who noticed the "wrong" party cues or were otherwise hostile towards the research.xii
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Across both surveys, respondents took approximately twelveminutes, and no respondent took less than 90 seconds,
to complete the entire survey. Like most Mturk samples, ours were more white (78% in Study 1 and 80% in Study
2), educated (63% in Study 1, and 62% in Study 2 had at least a college degree), and secular (47% in Study 1
and 44% in Study 2 never attend religious services, and 36% in Study 1 and 35% in Study 2 described themselves
as non-religious), while gender (54% female in Study 1, 58% female in Study 2) was more representative of the
general population. Further, as is typical with Mturk samples, respondents were more Democratic (57% Demo-
cratic, 12% Independent, and 31% Republican in Study 1, 56% Democratic, 13% Independent, 31% Republican
in Study 2), and Liberal (47% Liberal, 26% Moderate, and 27% Conservative in Study 1, 47% Liberal, 25% Mod-
erate, and 28% Conservative in Study 2) than the general population. Each respondent in both surveys was paid
fifty cents for their participation, commensurate with Mturk rates for 10-15-minute studies. While less representative
than more traditional internet surveys, Mturk is more representative than “in person convenience samples”
(Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). More importantly, experimental treatment
effects of Mturk samples are generalizable (Coppock, 2019; Levay, Freese, & Druckman, 2016; Mullinix, Leeper,
Druckman, & Freese, 2015).
Procedures
Before entering the survey, respondents in both studies answered three screener questions about their gender,
race, and religious denomination,xiii and consented to participation in the study. Immediately following the
screening, the experimental mock news story treatment was presented to respondents in order to prevent any
priming effects. Each treatment included a question asking respondents to state their support for protecting the
type of hate speech featured in the story.xiv Respondents then answered questions about their party identification,
ideological and political preferences, affect towards various social groups, moral foundations, and demographics.
In Study 2, respondents also answered questions regarding how much they found flag burning and anti-Muslim
speech to be generally considered hateful speech in American society, and personally offensive to them, immedi-
ately following the tolerance item.
Political Tolerance of Hate Speech
Our main dependent variable is political tolerance for hate speech, namely, the type of hate speech featured in
the experimental treatment. Tolerance was determined by asking respondents, immediately following the mock
news story: “In your opinion, do you agree or disagree that the First Amendment should protect this kind of
speech?”xv Respondents reported their level of support on a 6-point Likert scale that ranged from “strongly agree”
to “strongly disagree,” which was recoded 0-1 such that higher values indicate greater support for protecting, or
tolerating, that form of harmful speech (Study 1: M = 0.68, SD = 0.32; Study 2: M = 0.63, SD = 0.32).
Offensiveness of Hate Speech
It is possible that respondents did not deem the two instances of speech employed in our treatments (burning the
U.S. flag and drawing anti-Muslim cartoons) offensive, or even considered them as forms of hate speech, in which
case our treatments are unable to provide pathways for diminishing tolerance of hate speech. In order to ensure
that respondents actually considered these actions as constituting hate speech and to understand whether this
determination was made based on personal feelings or perceptions of public sentiment, Study 2 included two
items immediately following the experimental treatment and associated measure of tolerance. The first item asked
respondents to rate the extent to which they considered the type of speech in question offensive to Americans as
a whole, on a 4-point scale coded from 0="definitely not offensive" to 1="definitely offensive" (Flag burning: M =
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0.77, SD = 0.30; Anti-Muslim:M = 0.73, SD = 0.29). The second asked them to rate how personally offended they
were by that type of speech: not offended at all, somewhat offended, or extremely offended, recoded 0-1 such
that higher values represented greater offense (Flag burning: M = 0.55, SD = 0.42; Anti-Muslim: M = 0.42, SD =
0.39).xvi In the non-political control condition, 86% reported that burning the U.S. flag was either definitely or
probably offensive to Americans as a whole, with 74% stating it was either extremely or somewhat personally of-
fensive to them. Likewise, 80% of respondents in the control condition thought drawing anti-Muslim cartoons was
definitely or probably offensive to American society, and 65% found it somewhat or extremely personally offensive.
Taken together, respondents overwhelmingly considered these two instances forms of hateful speech.
Party Identity and Control Variables
In both studies, we measured respondents' partisan identities using the traditional 7-point self-placement item,
scaled from 0-1, where 0=Strong Democrat and 1=Strong Republican (Study 1: M = 0.41, SD = 0.34; Study 2:
M = 0.40, SD = 0.35). Based on this scale, we created two variables for partisan identifiers only: 1) a party identity
dummy, coded 0=Democrats and 1=Republicans, which combines strong partisans with leaners, and 2) partisan
strength operationalized as the folded 7-point scale (Study 1:M = 0.56, SD = 0.40; Study 2:M = 0.63, SD = 0.34).
We also assessed individual-level political preferences, moral foundations, and demographics including ideology,
political interest, race, gender, education, and church attendance (see Supplementary Materials, Table A1, for
details).
Analytical Strategy
Since our aim is to decipher which combinations of moral frames and partisan cues successfully decrease tolerance
of flag burning or anti-Muslim speech, we analyze our experimental treatment effects for each type of speech
separately using STATA 15. In Study 1, which has four treatment categories per type of speech, we estimate a
series of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) models that each regress tolerance for speech on the treatment factorial
variable, alternating which treatment serves as the excluded category (Tables 1 and 3). In Study 2, which contains
six treatment categories per type of speech, we estimate a 2x3 (Moral Frame X Party Cues) factorial design using
OLS, where Moral Frame has factor levels 1) No Moral Frame provided, and 2) Moral Frame provided; and Party
Cues has factor levels 1) No Party Cues provided, 2) Democratic Party Cues provided, and 3) Republican Party
Cues provided (Table 2). To estimate our treatment effects conditional upon respondents' partisan identification,
we use a 4x2 (Treatment X Party Identity dummy) factorial design in Study 1, and a 2x3x2 (Moral Frame X Party
Cues X Party Identity dummy) factorial design in Study 2, where tolerance of speech is regressed (again using
OLS) onto each factor and their interactions. We then use the "margins" package for post-estimation, generating
predicted values of tolerance across treatments (Figures 2 and 4) and marginal treatment effects for Republican
and Democratic respondents, with associated significance tests (Figures 3 and 5, and discussed in text as appro-
priate).
Results
The mean level of support for First Amendment freedom of speech protections – our measure of political tolerance
– for U.S. flag burning (top panels) and anti-Muslim speech (bottom panels) across all experimental conditions
and both studies is displayed in Figure 1 (Study 1 on left panels, Study 2 on right panels).
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Figure 1. Mean tolerance of hateful speech by condition.
Note. In Study 2, the non-political control condition is split into two, where respondents who answered the flag burning item
first comprise the flag burning control condition, and respondents who answered the anti-Muslim item first become the
anti-Muslim control condition.
First, consistent with contemporary public opinion on these issues, overall tolerance of anti-Muslim speech is
higher than that of flag burning when examining all respondents and collapsing across all conditions (Study 1: M
anti-Muslim speech = 0.74, M flag burning = 0.62, M difference = 0.12 on the 0-1 scale, t(1408) = 7.06, p < .01;
Study 2:M anti-Muslim speech = 0.67,M flag burning = 0.60,M difference = 0.07 on the 0-1 scale, t(2035) = 4.90,
p < .01). Yet, within each type of speech, we can visually inspect the conditions under which moral foundation
frames and party cues lower tolerance, viewing generally that tolerance of flag burning is more varied than anti-
Muslim speech. Further, a broad pattern of decreased tolerance emerges for all respondents (diamond markers),
Democrats (triangle markers), and Republicans (square markers). As such, we treat the free speech condition as
our baseline level of tolerance in Study 1, and the non-political control condition as the baseline in Study 2.
There is, however, a noteworthy deviation from this pattern. Average tolerance of anti-Muslim speech in Study
2's non-political control condition reflects a spillover ordering effect, such that tolerance of anti-Muslim speech
was marginally lower when asked immediately after the flag burning item (M = 0.622 v.M = 0.708, t(165) = 1.805,
p = .073 on a two-tailed test). As a result, we split Study 2's control condition into two, where respondents who
answered the flag burning item first comprise the flag burning control condition (M = 0.715, see Figure 1 top right
panel) and respondents who answered the anti-Muslim item first become the anti-Muslim control condition (M =
.708, see Figure 1 bottom right panel). Even with this revised baseline control, we still do not clearly discern de-
creased anti-Muslim speech tolerance stemming from our treatments, despite finding equivalent levels of tolerance
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among respondents in the harm frame condition in both studies (Study 1 M = 0.702, 95% CI [0.66, 0.75]; Study 2
M = 0.702, 95% CI [0.66, 0.74]). Yet, those in the anti-Muslim speech control condition revealed less tolerance
than those in Study 1's free speech condition by approximately 9% of the 0-1 scale.xvii On the surface, decreasing
tolerance for anti-Muslim speech seems best accomplished through priming non-political considerations or other
instances of offensive political speech. Nonetheless, we explore the efficacy of our various moral foundation and
party cue appeals, particularly as they affect partisans, in the context of decreasing tolerance for flag burning and
anti-Muslim speech.
Decreasing Flag Burning Tolerance
We begin examining support for protecting flag burning speech aggregating across all respondents. Though such
aggregation may wash out party cue treatment effects, especially in Study 1 where opposing stances from both
parties are presented simultaneously, these analyses still provide important information regarding the effectiveness
of moral foundation frames and party positioning in moving mass public opinion. Foremost, we can discover
whether moral frames can decrease tolerance for harmful speech, enmasse, regardless of citizens' party affiliations
(or lack thereof), ideological values, or personal morality positions (per theMoral Frame Alone Hypothesis). Next,
we can assess whether opposition from any political party is sufficient to decrease tolerance, as evidence of more
generalized political elite cueing (per Zaller, 1992, and the Party Cues Alone Hypothesis). And finally, we can reveal
if a particular political party's opposition exerts greater influence over tolerance, thus providing evidence of party
ownership over certain forms of harmful speech.
Turning to Study 1 (Table 1), relative to the baseline free speech frame, framing flag burning as a violation of
loyalty morals has no effect on tolerance for this speech (B = -0.028, n.s., Column 1).xviii However, when either
the Republican or the Democratic party endorses the loyalty moral violation in opposition of flag burning, this ad-
ditional party cue significantly decreases political tolerance of the speech (B = -0.079, p < .05 when Democratic
Party endorses, B = -0.094, p < .05 when Republican Party endorses, see Column 2) compared to the level of
tolerance when the loyalty frame alone is presented. This combination leads to a significant reduction in tolerance
of flag burning speech relative to the baseline free speech frame of about 10% of the 0-1 scale (B = -0.107, p <
.05 when Democratic Party endorses, B = -0.122, p < .05 when Republican Party endorses, see Column 1).
In Study 2 (Figure 2, and Table 2, Columns 1 through 3), use of the loyalty moral value frame alone did reduce
tolerance of flag burning compared to the control condition (B = -0.115, p < .01), in contrast to Study 1. Respondents
also exhibited lower levels of flag burning tolerance when either the Democratic or Republican Party opposed flag
burning when compared to the control condition, by about 15% and 16% of the 0-1 scale, respectively (B = -0.151,
p < .01 when Democratic Party opposes, B = -0.164, p < .01 when Republican Party opposes). While we also see
significantly less tolerance when the party's opposition to flag burning is coupled with the loyalty moral appeal
relative to the control in Figure 2, these effects are smaller than when the loyalty frame or party cues were utilized
independently of one another (given the significant interaction coefficients of B = 0.122, p < .05 for the Democratic
Party, and B = 0.182, p < .01 for Republican Party in Table 2, Column 1). Further, compared to the loyalty frame
alone or the party opposition alone treatments, the pairing of party cues with moral frames had no effect on flag
burning tolerance, suggesting that the negative effects found for the combined party cue/moral frame treatments
in Study 1 are driven almost exclusively by the additional partisan information. Across studies, these aggregate
findings provide mixed support forMoral Frame Alone Hypothesis and consistent support for the Party Cues Alone
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Hypothesis, and appear consistent with Zaller (1992), in that a frame is generally more persuasive than no frame,
and elite appeals are more powerful than no appeals.
Table 1





––––Free Speech Frame .0410.0620.0430.0320.0370.122**0.0380.0280
––––Loyalty Frame .0430.0300.0430.032-0.0380.094*0.0380.028-0
Dem Party using Loyalty Frame .0430.012-0.0450.042-0.0430.074
‡-0.0380.0150.0380.079*-0.0380.107**-0
––––Rep Party using Loyalty Frame .0430.030-0.0410.062-0.0380.094*-0.0370.122**-0
Party ID .0540.360**-0.0620.235**-0.0630.208**-0
––Free Speech Frame X Party ID .0830.151
‡0.0890.0260
––Loyalty Frame X Party ID .0820.1250.0890.026-0
Dem Party Loyalty Frame X Party ID .0790.1110.0850.014-0.0860.040-0
––Rep Party Loyalty Frame X Party ID .0820.125-0.0830.151
‡-0
Constant .0300.692**0.0320.722**0.0290.754**0.0270.564**0.0270.658**0.0260.686**0
Note.OLS regression estimates with robust standard errors. In Columns 1 and 4, the "Free Speech Frame" is the excluded treatment category,
in Columns 2 and 5 the "Loyalty Frame" is the excluded treatment category, and in Columns 3 and 6 the "Republican Party using Loyalty
Frame" is the excluded treatment category. Party ID is a dichotomous variable coded 0=Democrats, and 1=Republicans. All analyses are
confined to the subset of respondents who received one of the flag burning treatments (i.e. respondents viewing an anti-Muslim speech
treatment are excluded from the above models). These same models with demographic controls are provided in the Supplementary Materials,
Table A3. Table A4 (Supplementary Materials) estimates the models shown in Columns 1 and 4, including an interaction between each
treatment and respondents' loyalty morality to check for any heterogeneous treatment effects.
aN = 704, R2 = 0.020. bN = 623, R2 = 0.157.
‡p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01.
We next turn to how Republicans and Democrats responded to our flag burning treatments. Democrats are, on
average, more tolerant of flag burning than Republicans in Study 1's baseline free speech condition (Democrats
M = 0.754 v. Republicans M = 0.545, t(146) = 3.62, p < .01, see Figure 1, top left panel) and in Study 2's control
condition (Democrats M = 0.781 v. Republicans M = 0.576, t(77) = 2.9, p < .05, see Figure 1, top right panel),
comporting with partisan divides in public opinion on the matter. Yet, both Democratic and Republican respondents
decreased their tolerance towards flag burning, with their patterns of reduced tolerance conditional upon how
moral foundation values, party cues, and their combination were used to frame the issue.
Similar to all respondents, in Study 1 (see Figure 3, and Table 1, Columns 4 through 6) the loyalty moral foundation
frame alone had no effect on reducing tolerance of flag burning relative to the free speech baseline condition
among partisans (B = -0.032 for Democrats, B = -0.058 for Republicans, both n.s., see Figure 3, top left panel,
and Table 1, Column 4). However, in Study 2 (see Figure 2, and Table 2, Column 2), Democrats (but not Repub-
licansxix) reduced their average tolerance in the loyalty frame condition relative to the pure control (B = -0.125, p
< .01). This inconsistent support for the Moral Frame Alone Hypothesis is probably due to differing baselines,
where Study 1 used the free speech frame instead of a true control as the point of comparison. By including the
pure control in Study 2, it is clear that moral frames alone can reduce tolerance for flag burning.
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Figure 2. Experimental treatment effects on flag burning tolerance (Study 2).
Note.Open dots represent the estimated predicted values for tolerance of speech in each of the flag burning speech conditions
plus control condition, with 95% confidence interval bars. All estimates are derived from OLS regression models that employ
a factorial design (see Table 2). Estimates for "All Respondents" are derived from the 2x3 factorial design without demographic
controls estimated in Table 2, Column 1. Estimates for "Democrats Only" and "Republicans Only" are derived from the 2x3x2
factorial design without demographic controls estimated in Table 2, Column 2.
When examining tolerance towards flag burning in Study 2 we find support for the Party Cues Alone Hypothesis
among Democrats, while among Republicans party cues alone decrease tolerance only when coming from the
in-party (see Figure 2, middle and right panels). Democrats receiving information that either the Democratic or
Republican Party opposed flag burning are on average 10% to 19% less tolerant of this speech than Democrats
in the control group (B = -0.186, p < .01 Democratic Party cues; B = -0.102, p < .05 Republican Party cues). In
contrast, when the Republican Party opposes flag burning, tolerance among Republican respondents typically
decreases by about 25% of the 0-1 scale (B = -0.259, p < .01), compared to Republicans in the control, with no
significant effect of Democratic Party cues on Republican respondents.
The Congruent Moral Frame from In-Party Hypothesis predicts that partisans will be particularly receptive to cues
from the in-party when they invoke a moral foundation that is found in the party's lexicon (i.e. the Republican
Party and loyalty moral values). We observe this pattern of effects in Study 1. When the Republican Party uses
the loyalty moral violation in opposition to flag burning, this typically reduces tolerance relative to the loyalty frame
alone by 15% of the scale (B = -0.15, p < .05, see Figure 3 bottom middle panel, and Table 1, Column 5), and to
the free speech frame by over 20% of the scale (B = -0.21, p < .05, see Figure 3 top right panel, and Table 1,
Column 4), the largest effects on flag burning tolerance gleaned in Study 1. However, the experimental design
used in Study 1 enmeshed cues from both parties with moral frameworks, making it unclear whether these effects
were due to the Republican Party's opposition, their use of the loyalty moral violation frame, or the Democratic
Party's support of flag burning as a form of free speech.
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Table 2
Experimental Treatment Effects for Flag Burning and Anti-Muslim Speech (Study 2)





Democratic Party Cues .0540.084-0.0390.082*-0.0510.186**-0.0420.151**-0
Republican Party Cues .0540.039-0.0380.041-0.0490.102*-0.0440.164**-0
Moral Frame X Democratic Party Cues .0680.0510.0500.0690.0680.144*0.0560.122*0
Moral Frame X Republican Party Cues .0670.0070.0480.0050.0660.155*0.0580.182**0
Respondent's Party Identity .0690.048-0.0780.205**-0
Moral Frame X Party Identity .0820.0690.0990.005-0
Democratic Party Cues X Party Identity .0910.008-0.1020.1540
Republican Party Cues X Party Identity .0840.022-0.0980.157-0
Moral Frame X Democratic Party Cues X Party Identity .1120.0740.1310.055-0
Moral Frame X Republican Party Cues X Party Identity .1050.0210.1290.1090
Constant .0440.728**0.0310.708**0.0360.781**0.0320.715**0
Note. OLS regression estimates with robust standard errors. Columns 1 and 3 provide estimates from a 2x3 factorial design, and Columns 2
and 4 provide estimates from a 2x3x2 factorial design. In each model, Moral Frame has factor levels 1) No Moral Frame provided, and 2)
Moral Frame provided; Party Cues has factor levels: 1) No Party Cues provided, 2) Democratic Party Cues provided, and 3) Republican
Party Cues provided; and Party Identity has factor levels 1) Democratic identifying respondents, and 2) Republican identifying respondents.
As such, coefficients reported in the "Constant" are mean levels of tolerance for speech in the pure control condition (for each type of speech),
and are also Democrats in the 3-way factorial. Analyses are confined to the subset of respondents who received only that certain type of
speech treatment, notated by column titles "Flag Burning Speech" and "Anti-Muslim Speech," respectively. These same models with demo-
graphic controls are provided in the Supplementary Materials, Table A7. Table A8 (Supplementary Materials) estimates these models, including
an interaction between each treatment and respondents' loyalty morality to check for any heterogeneous treatment effects.
aN = 898, R2 = 0.018. bN = 788, R2 = 0.111. cN = 972, R2 = 0.009. dN = 845, R2 = 0.017.
‡p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01.
Disentangling these effects in Study 2, we find that, while Republicans reveal less tolerance when the Republican
Party uses the loyalty frame to oppose flag burning compared to the control (B = -0.124, p < .05), this effect is
smaller than when Republican opposition was provided without any loyalty moral justification (see Figure 2 right
panel). In fact, compared to the Republican opposition frame alone, the Republican Party's usage of loyalty
marginally increases flag burning tolerance (B = 0.136, p = .053). Further, there is no significant difference in
Republicans' average tolerance to flag burning when the Democratic Party opposes using the loyalty frame, relative
to the control, the loyalty frame alone, or Democratic Party opposition alone. This suggests that out-party cues,
even when employing the correct moral packaging, are still ineffective. Combined, loyalty moral values do little
to buttress the effectiveness of party cues for Republicans, regardless of which party endorses the loyalty frame,
failing to support the Congruent Moral Frame from In-Party Hypothesis or the Congruent Moral Frame from Out-
Party Hypothesis. Instead, in-party cues are more powerful than loyalty in reducing tolerance for flag burning
among Republicans.
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Figure 3. Experimental treatment effects on flag burning tolerance by party ID (Study 1).
Note. Open dots represent the estimated marginal effects of the experimental treatment (the comparison described in each
panel's title) for Democrats and Republicans, with lines representing 95% confidence intervals. The three panels in the top
row present marginal effects generated from the OLS regression model without demographic controls provided in Table 1,
Column 4. The left and middle panels in the bottom row present marginal effects generated from the OLS regression model
without demographic controls provided in Table 1, Column 5. The right panel in the bottom row presents marginal effects
generated from the OLS regression model without demographic controls provided in Table 1, Column 6.
Since the Democratic Party typically tolerates flag burning and does not rely on loyalty values when speaking to
its base, our treatments allow us to assess the effects of partisan endorsement of unorthodox moral values in line
with the Incongruent Moral Frame from In-Party Hypothesis. Compared to tolerance in Study 2's pure control,
Democrats decreased their tolerance for flag burning, on average, by 17% when told that the Democratic Party
opposes flag burning on the grounds it is a betrayal to patriotic Americans (B = -0.166, p < .05, see Figure 2
middle panel), which is evidence of successful moral repackaging wherein party cues shape attitudes using incon-
gruent moral appeals. However, given that average flag burning tolerance is statistically indistinguishable between
the loyalty frame alone, Democratic Party opposition alone, and Democratic Party with loyalty frame conditions
(see Figure 2 middle panel), the repackaged moral argument is no more effective at reducing tolerance than
party cues or moral frames in isolation. We therefore consider this weak support for the Incongruent Moral Frame
from In-Party Hypothesis. We also find no evidence for the Backlash Hypothesis, since relative to the control or
Republican opposition alone, Democrats' average tolerance of flag burning either decreased or remained the
same when presented with Republican opposition using the loyalty frame (see Figure 2 middle panel).
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In sum, moral value frames and party cues decreased tolerance for flag burning among all respondents combined,
as well as among Democrats. Republicans were responsive to loyalty frames alone, and to flag burning opposition
from the Republican party, but not from the Democratic Party. Thus, even attitudes on an issue that resonates
with Republicans' preferences for national loyalty can be moved given the right approach. Interestingly, the pairing
of party cues and loyalty moral values did not reduce tolerance to any greater degree than party cues alone, re-
gardless of the party identity of the respondent, indicating the primacy and power of party leaders to mold attitudes
that possess moral roots.
Decreasing Anti-Muslim Tolerance
When assessing tolerance for anti-Muslim speech, specifically an instance of drawing the prophet Muhammed,
we first examine our treatment effects aggregated across all respondents (for the same reasons provided in the
case of flag burning tolerance).xx In Study 1 (Table 3, Column 1), we find that reduced tolerance for anti-Muslim
speech emerges in the presence of a harm moral violation frame alone (B = -0.094, p < .01), and when this frame
is endorsed by the Democratic (B = -0.068, p < .05) or Republican Party (B = -0.064, p < .05), compared to the
free speech frame. In Study 2 (Table 2, Column 3), Democratic Party opposition to anti-Muslim speech typically
reduces tolerance by about 8% of the 0-1 scale (B = -0.082, p < .05), otherwise our treatments fail to decrease
tolerance for anti-Muslim speech relative to the control condition. As such, we find mixed support for the Moral
Frame Alone Hypothesis (Study 1 only), and the Party Cues Alone Hypothesis (when the Democratic Party op-
poses, Study 2). Together, support for protecting anti-Muslim speech can be reduced within the mass public when
it is framed as a violation of the harm moral foundation but only when used to counter a free speech appeal.
Looking exclusively at partisan respondents, mean tolerance for anti-Muslim speech is marginally higher among
Republicans than Democrats in Study 1's baseline free speech condition (Democrats M = 0.778 v. Republicans
M = 0.838, t(152) = 1.41, p = .081 on a one-tailed test), but is equivalent in Study 2's baseline control condition
(Democrats M = 0.728 v. Republicans M = 0.68, t(64) = 0.69, p = 0.49 on a two-tailed test). Though, compared
to that of flag burning, the variation in tolerance of anti-Muslim speech across conditions for both sets of partisans
appears relatively small (see bottom portion of Figure 1). As such, even when we examine partisans in isolation
(Figure 5, and Table 3, Columns 4 through 6 for Study 1; Figure 4 middle and right panels, and Table 2, Column
4 for Study 2), our treatments have minimal (and occasionally adverse) effects on reducing tolerance towards
anti-Muslim speech. While in Study 1 the harmmorality violation frame decreases tolerance for anti-Muslim speech
among Democrats (B = -0.095, p < .05) and marginally among Republicans (B = -0.099, p = .065) relative to the
free speech frame condition (see Figure 5, top left panel, and Table 3, Column 4), this moral frame fails to move
Democrats (B = -0.037, n.s., see Figure 4 middle panel) or Republicans (B = 0.033, n.s., see Figure 4 right panel)
compared to the control condition in Study 2. We again find mixed support for theMoral Frames Alone Hypothesis
depending upon which baseline comparison we employ.
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Table 3





––––Free Speech Frame .0370.101**0.0400.095*0.0270.068*0.0300.094**0
––––Harm Frame .0400.0050.0400.095*-0.0310.025-0.0300.094**-0
––––Dem Party using Harm Frame .0400.005-0.0370.101**-0.0310.0250.0270.068*-0
0.062‡Rep Party using Harm Frame .0360.0380.0560.0360.039-0.0270.0050.0290.0300.0260.064*-0
Party ID .0450.099*0.0530.0560.0400.0600
––Free Speech Frame X Party ID .0600.039-0.0670.0040
––Harm Frame X Party ID .0700.043-0.0670.004-0
––Dem Party Harm Frame X Party ID .0700.0430.0600.0390
Rep Party Harm Frame X Party ID .0610.121*-0.0680.077-0.0570.081-0
Constant .0270.678**0.0300.683**0.0260.778**0.0200.727**0.0230.702**0.0190.796**0
Note.OLS regression estimates with robust standard errors. In Columns 1 and 4, the "Free Speech Frame" is the excluded treatment category,
in Columns 2 and 5 the "Harm Frame" is the excluded treatment category, and in Columns 3 and 6 the "Democratic Party using Harm Frame"
is the excluded treatment category. Party ID is a dichotomous variable coded 0=Democrats, and 1=Republicans. All analyses are confined
to the subset of respondents who received one of the anti-Muslim speech treatments (i.e. respondents viewing a flag burning treatment are
excluded from the above models). These same models with demographic controls are provided in the Supplementary Materials, Table A5.
Table A6 (Supplementary Materials) estimates the models shown in Columns 1 and 4, including an interaction between each treatment and
respondents' loyalty morality to check for any heterogeneous treatment effects.
aN = 706, R2 = 0.017. bN = 618, R2 = 0.032.
‡p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01.
Given Democrats' disdain for harm towards marginalized groups like Muslims (Haidt, 2012; Koleva et al., 2012),
we anticipated that when the Democratic Party opposed anti-Muslim speech (per the Party Cues Alone Hypothesis),
or the Democratic Party utilized the harm frame in opposition to anti-Muslim speech (per the Congruent Moral
Frame from In-Party Hypothesis), Democratic respondents would respond in kind by reducing tolerance for this
harmful speech. On one hand, the combination of Democratic Party opposition and harm frame does produce a
10% reduction of tolerance compared to the free speech frame in Study 1 (B = -0.101, p < .01, see Table 3, Column
4), as expected. But, the additional Democratic Party cue does not further decrease Democrats' tolerance compared
to the harm frame alone in Study 1 (B = -0.005, n.s., see Table 3, Column 5), and in Study 2 Democrats' tolerance
remains virtually unchanged when provided information about the Democratic Party's position on offensive anti-
Muslim speech.xxi
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Figure 4. Experimental treatment effects of anti-Muslim tolerance (Study 2).
Note.Open dots represent the estimated predicted values for tolerance of speech in each of the anti-Muslim speech conditions
plus control condition, with 95% confidence interval bars. All estimates are derived from OLS regression models that employ
a factorial design (see Table 2). Estimates for "All Respondents" are derived from the 2x3 factorial design without demographic
controls estimated in Table 2, Column 3. Estimates for "Democrats Only" and "Republicans Only" are derived from the 2x3x2
factorial design without demographic controls estimated in Table 2, Column 4.
Even though Democrats emphasize the value of care/harm to a greater degree than Republicans, we find support
for the Congruent Moral Frame from In-Party Hypothesis only when these moral appeals are pitted against a free
speech argument (Study 1). Since Study 1 presents the position of both parties simultaneously, we cannot determine
whether Democrats reacted to the morally congruent appeal from their party, or in resistance to the free speech
position of the out-party. Thus, our results are minimally supportive of the Congruent Moral Frame from In-Party
Hypothesis hypothesis. Democrats, furthermore, were unmoved by any Republican appeal condemning anti-
Muslim speech in either study,xxii even when Republican Party leaders invoked the moral value of care/harm. As
such, we lack support for the Congruent Moral Frame from Out-Party Hypothesis.
Republican respondents, on the other hand, reacted to their party's endorsement of harm morality violations in
the context of anti-Muslim speech by reducing their tolerance of this form of hate speech in Study 1 – supportive
evidence of the Incongruent Moral Frame from In-Party Hypothesis. Specifically, when the Republican Party dis-
cussed anti-Muslim speech as being harmful to Muslims, this message resonated with Republicans, resulting in
a 12% decrease, on average, in tolerance compared to the free speech frame (B = -0.12, p < .01, see Figure 5
top right panel and Table 3, Column 4). Our results demonstrate that Republicans can exhibit intolerance for anti-
Muslim speech when that speech is framed as a moral violation paired with in-party opposition.
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Figure 5. Experimental treatment effects on anti-Muslim tolerance by party ID (Study 1).
Note. Open dots represent the estimated marginal effects of the experimental treatment (the comparison described in each
panel's title) for Democrats and Republicans, with lines representing 95% confidence intervals. The three panels in the top
row present marginal effects generated from the OLS regression model without demographic controls provided in Table 3,
Column 4. The left and middle panels in the bottom row present marginal effects generated from the OLS regression model
without demographic controls provided in Table 3, Column 5. The right panel in the bottom row presents marginal effects
generated from the OLS regression model without demographic controls provided in Table 3, Column 6.
While this finding may provide evidence of the normatively optimistic conclusion that members of the political right
can be softened in their views towards Muslims, it is possible that this result instead reflects a "negative partisan-
ship"-style backlash (per Abramowitz & Webster, 2016) to the Democratic Party's support of anti-Muslim speech
on free speech grounds in Study 1. Study 2 provides support for this Backlash Hypothesis among Republican
respondents. When reading that the Democratic Party opposes anti-Muslim speech because it harms Muslim-
Americans, Republicans became more tolerant of it than they were when hearing about Democratic Party oppo-
sition without any moral framing (B = 0.16, p < .05, see Figure 4 right panel). Thus, it is not simply the endorsement
by the out-party, but the out-party's explicit use of the care/harm frame as justification for opposition that drives
Republicans' increasing tolerance of anti-Muslim speech.
In sum, the harm moral foundation alone as a tool to reduce tolerance of anti-Muslim speech has limited utility.
While it can decrease tolerance among all respondents, both Democrats and Republicans, when contrasted
against free speech appeals, it is ineffective when used against a non-political control. Encouragingly, among
Republicans the combination of the harmmoral violation with in-party opposition significantly reduced anti-Muslim
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tolerance in Study 1. But the converse combination, out-party opposition using a harm moral violation, actually
increased tolerance of anti-Muslim speech in Study 2.
Discussion and Implications
Across two survey experiments each employing two examples of hate speech, we demonstrate that the effects
of framing on tolerance for hate speech vary depending on the political target group and the baseline condition.
While not uniform, we found the most consistent evidence in support of the Moral Frames Alone and Party Cues
Alone Hypotheses. In the case of flag burning, we observed this pattern relative to a non-political control among
all respondents. Partisans were also responsive to cues from the in-party, and occasionally exhibited decreased
tolerance towards hate speech when it was presented as a moral frame violation that resonated with their party's
values (i.e., Republicans and loyalty) – supporting theCongruent Moral Frame from In-Party Hypothesis. However,
there were no real additive effects of moral frames and party cues. The combination of Republican Party and
loyalty morality did not decrease tolerance more than either loyalty frames or Republican Party cues on their own.
There also was mixed, albeit limited, evidence of a party’s ability to repackagemoral values among fellow partisans.
While morally congruent arguments from the out-party had no effect on reducing tolerance, morally incongruent
appeals from the in-party (i.e., Democratic Party embracing loyalty) reduced tolerance of flag burning speech
among Democrats – evidence of the Incongruent Moral Frame from In-Party Hypothesis. There is no consistent
evidence that harm morality appeals can decrease tolerance for Anti-Muslim speech in the absence of a free
speech counter-argument. Instead, Republicans became more tolerant of anti-Muslim speech when it was con-
demned by the Democratic Party as a violation of the care/harm value, in support of the Backlash Hypothesis.
Thus, party cues have the ability, with or without attachment to moral values, to shape opinions of hate speech
either positively or negatively, therefore demonstrating the formidable nature of party identification.
What could explain these inconsistent results? First, the differences between the two studies might be attributable
to the distinct baseline used in each study. In Study 1, we employed a free speech frame wherein the speech in
question was defended as being protected by the First Amendment as our baseline condition. This baseline was
not necessarily a true control because it likely primed political considerations related to civil liberties. In Study 2,
contrastingly, we adopted a neutral, non-political topic for the control, thus avoiding any potential political priming.
Second, Study 2 afforded us the opportunity to tease apart the effects of party and morality using more nuanced
treatments. In Study 1, when respondents were provided with an elite cue, it came from both the Republican
Party and the Democratic Party simultaneously, and always referenced a morality violation. While our significant
party and morality effects in Study 1 seemingly suggest that these appeals work best in conjunction, Study 2
shows this is not the case. When we peel apart moral values and party cues in Study 2 our findings suggest that
party cues work on their own, and coupling moral values and party cues is actually less effective in reducing tol-
erance for flag burning than party cues alone. This evidence of party cue persuasion is quite remarkable given
the importance and salience of the flag in American political culture (and in contrast to what would be expected
per Ciuk & Yost, 2016).
Regarding the receptiveness of partisans to their respective party’s endorsement of an atypical moral value, the
evidence for moral repackaging is limited. On one hand, Democrats did respond to a moral value not typically
associated with their political party. When compared to the control in Study 2, Democrats were more likely to oppose
flag burning when the value of loyalty was invoked by their party leaders. Republicans, however, ignored appeals
Journal of Social and Political Psychology
2019, Vol. 7(2), 695–725
https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.v7i2.1006
Armstrong & Wronski 717
highlighting harm whether or not it was employed by their party leaders, except when it was pitted against a free
speech appeal made by the Democratic Party in Study 1. In no instance of speech in either study did morally
congruent appeals from the out-party decrease tolerance for harmful speech – in contrast to the main theoretical
expectation of the moral reframing literature. Instead of adjusting policy arguments to match the moral values of
the target group (per Feinberg & Willer, 2013, 2015), party cues alone had the ability to change moral value re-
ceptiveness among their partisans. Such a finding provides an important contribution to moral reframing theory,
and a possible avenue for future research on this topic.
Several aspects of the paper deserve particular attention. First, it is important to note that the question of restricting
hate speech might not be fully captured with a single Likert-scale measure. Second, while our studies include
large samples, the number of Republicans in each treatment condition is limited. Based upon a G*Power analysis
we should have at least 90 Republicans per treatment in order to discern our small effects (ranging from .1 to .15)
with an alpha of 0.05. Instead, we obtain anywhere from 44 to 68 Republicans per treatment across both studies.
As a result, we have insufficient power to find significant treatment effects among Republican respondents (see
also FN19). Third, opinions might have been different if we had included the names of actual party leaders instead
of Republican and Democratic Party labels. For instance, if we had chosen President Trump as the Republican
figure, answers might have been driven more by his persona than the party cue itself. Future studies could insert
real Republican and Democratic elites and compare the results with those found in this study. Last, what constitutes
hate speech is debatable, illustrating the inherent subjectivity of speech. Indeed, definitions of what is considered
"hateful" often are broad and vague and, as a result, open to interpretation (Brink, 2001; Brison, 2013). Nonetheless,
the ability to frame the message is a powerful tool, and future studies should examine the fluidity of opinions re-
garding other targets of hate speech, including the ongoing controversy regarding the kneeling of athletes during
the national anthem.
Despite these potential drawbacks, our findings carry important normative implications for promoting social justice
by illuminating methods which political leaders and advocates can employ in order to undercut tolerance for ex-
ceptionally uncivil speech. In the current American political environment where a new type of vitriol has been
normalized, party leaders can generate opposition toward certain forms of hate speech, even when that speech
is targeted at relatively unpopular ethnic or religious groups (such as Muslim-Americans). Such a shift in attitudes
about hate speech might lessen negative attitudes toward these groups. In this respect, party leaders can facilitate
a more tolerant society by discussing hate speech as a type of morality violation, or simply and more effectively,
by condemning such speech without moral appeals.
On a more melancholic note, party leaders could use their influence to exacerbate existing tensions and promote
certain stereotypes and prejudices. Equally troubling, a party’s opposition to hateful speech could actually generate
greater intolerance from the other side. We found that among Republicans, tolerance of anti-Muslim speech actu-
ally increases when the Democratic Party employed the moral value of harm to oppose anti-Muslim speech. In
that instance, a backlash was generated among Republicans, who became more tolerant of cartoons that are
deeply offensive to Muslims. This finding extends the research on negative partisanship (Abramowitz & Webster,
2016), which finds that animus toward the out-party is a stronger motivator of political attitudes than affect for the
in-party.
But controlling the debate, and setting its terms is paramount. In fact, the best methods to lower public support
for protecting anti-Muslim hate speech may be to prime non-political topics, or other forms of offensive speech
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(i.e. flag burning). As such, it is helpful to recognize that each issue might need to be framed and debated in dif-
ferent terms, since employing a free speech counterargument can decrease tolerance for hate speech in some
instances, while other times the most effective arguments against hate speech are apolitical.
Social justice issues that conflict with civil liberty principles present a formidable challenge to message framing.
This challenge can be overcome, however, in some instances, by party cues alone. If, however, different issues
or even different forms of hate speech were studied, the results might differ, and opinions might be less malleable
or more contingent on a coupling of moral values and party cues. Further, Democrats might demonstrate the
negative partisanship pattern seen here by Republicans on the issue of anti-Muslim speech. Ongoing shifts, such
as the deepening schism between the two major political parties, might further change this party-morality dynamic,
particularly in relation to combating hate speech. Regardless, it is likely that partisan cues will continue to color
judgments on the issue of acceptable speech.
Finally, some might view reducing hateful speech as an evolutionary stage of an advanced democracy, a process
that will produce a more tolerant, more considerate society. Others, however, might read these results with great
trepidation and caution. Strong proponents of free speech could look at these findings as evidence of the public’s
lack of appreciation of the First Amendment. Irrespective of the position taken in the debate over offensive speech,
opinions on such issues will continue to be influenced by framing, partisan-elite rhetoric, and moral appeals.
Notes
i) Individuals within a society may vary in the extent to which they are offended, threatened, or insulted by any particular
instance of speech that meets this technical definition. Thus, for our purposes we are interested in speech that a majority of
United States citizens would characterize as harmful and offensive to society as a whole.
ii) https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/trump-defends-white-nationalist-protesters-some-very-fine-people-on-
both-sides/537012/
iii) See also Supplementary Materials, Table A2.
iv) While this statement indicates an interaction between a message's moral frame and an individual's party identity, it is not
to say that such moral appeals have absolutely no effect in the aggregate. It is possible that loyalty and harm moral arguments
can reduce tolerance among an ideologically incongruent target audience (and we find in some instances that they do), but
these effects should be less prevalent than those of morally congruent appeals. Further, the primary purpose of this study is
to identify the types of messaging strategies that can make Democrats, Republicans, and citizens as a whole less tolerant of
hate speech, not to pinpoint interaction effects relative to moral reframing. Therefore, while we statistically test the moderating
effects of party identity on message frames, we do not offer any explicit hypotheses related to these tests.
v) The survey was approved by the Institutional Research Board at The University of Mississippi.




vii) The anti-Muslim speech referenced in the story involved a violent encounter. This violent encounter was omitted from our
treatments so as not to bias respondents who may have reacted to the violence instead of to the speech.
viii) In both Study 1 and Study 2, random assignment successfully balanced subjects across conditions on the basis of their
party identity, ideology, race, gender, education, and church attendance.
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ix) In both studies, we used Qualtrics' randomizer function to present each respondent with one of the treatment conditions,
allowing for unequal assignment (i.e. we did not specify balancing across conditions).
x) The topic discussed in the control condition is the obscure sport of Kaninhop, also known as bunny jumping. Similar to the
tactic employed by Feinberg andWiller (2015), we selected this topic because of its uncontroversial nature and lack of familiarity.
The sport of bunny jumping should not have primed considerations related to hate speech, as less than 10% of respondents
rated it as socially or personally offensive. The text of this condition can be found under the description of bunny jumping found
in this list: https://list25.com/the-25-most-obscure-sports-in-the-world/2/
xi) To avoid further increasing the number of conditions, we chose not to include conditions where either party defended the
speech in question. Thus, the conditions in Study 2 have each party taking a stance against hate speech, but not defending
it. This meshes with the paper's focus to determine how tolerance for hate speech can be reduced.
xii) When accounting for the responses to our demographic variables, we obtained a realized N = 1402 in Study 1, and N =
1870 in Study 2.
xiii) These items were used to screen Muslim respondents who may have been offended by the Muhammed cartoon contest
story and associated picture, resulting in 19 respondents dropped from Study 1, and 21 from Study 2.
xiv) Respondents in Study 2's control condition were asked their support for protecting flag-burning and anti-Muslim speech
on the screen immediately following the story about bunny jumping, with the order in which these two items were presented
randomized to account for ordering effects. Item order had no effect on flag burning tolerance (mean when shown first = 0.715,
mean when shown second = 0.656, t(166) = 1.19, p = 0.24 on a two-tailed test), though it did impact tolerance for anti-Muslim
speech (see results section for discussion of how these order effects are incorporated into the analyses).
xv) The text of these items in Study 2's control condition read as follows: "In your opinion, do you agree or disagree that the
First Amendment should protect [flag/burning/drawing anti-Muslim cartoons]?" followed by the same six response options
provided in the other conditions.
xvi) The text of these questions read as follows: 1) “For each type of speech listed, please rate how much you think this type
of speech reflects the definition of hate speech provided above. To be clear, we are not asking for your personal opinion, but
rather whether you think Americans as a wholewould consider each of the following hate speech based on the above definition."
2) “For each type of speech listed, please rate how much you are personally offended by it.”
xvii) Study 1 free speech condition M = 0.796, 95% CI [0.76,0.83]; Study 2 control condition, anti-Muslim item first M = 0.708,
95% CI [0.65, 0.77].
xviii) Unless otherwise specified, all reported p-values for beta coefficients are based upon a two-tailed t-test. There are no
significant heterogeneous treatment effects across levels of loyalty/betrayal moral values in Study 1 (see Supplementary
Materials, Table A4) or Study 2 (see Supplementary Materials, Table A8, Columns 1 and 2).
xix) The effect of the loyalty frame alone for Republican respondents is in the hypothesized negative direction, but does not
meet the threshold for statistical significance (B = -0.13, p = .136). We suspect that the lack of significance in this instance
may result from the low number of Republican respondents in Study 2 (see discussion and implications section for power
limitations in our studies).
xx) There are no significant heterogeneous treatment effects across levels of care/harm moral values in Study 1 (see
Supplementary Materials, Table A6) or Study 2 (see Supplementary Materials, Table A8, Columns 3 and 4).
xxi) Interestingly in Study 2, information about Democratic Party opposition marginally reduced anti-Muslim speech tolerance
among Democrats, compared to the control, when controlling for respondents' political interest, race, gender, church attendance,
and education (B = -0.104, p = .052, see Supplementary Materials, Table A7, Column 4).
xxii) See overlapping estimates in Figure 4 middle panel, and Democrats' non-significant marginal effects in Figure 5 top right
and bottom right panels.
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